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Abstract
A decision maker starts from a judgmental decision and moves to the
closest boundary of the confidence interval. This statistical decision
rule is admissible and does not perform worse than the judgmental
decision with a probability equal to the confidence level, which is in-
terpreted as a coefficient of statistical risk aversion. The confidence
level is related to the decision makerâĂŹs aversion to uncertainty and
can be elicited with laboratory experiments using urns a` la Ellsberg.
The decision rule is applied to a problem of asset allocation for an
investor whose judgmental decision is to keep all her wealth in cash.
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1 Introduction
Most people take decisions in an uncertain environment without resorting to
formal statistical analysis (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). I refer to these
decisions as judgmental decisions. Statistical decision theory uses data to
prescribe optimal choices under a set of assumptions (Wald, 1950), but has
no explicit role for judgmental decisions. This paper is concerned with the
following questions: Is a given judgmental decision optimal in the light of
empirical evidence? If not, how can it be improved?
The answer to the first question is obtained by testing whether, for a
given loss function, the first derivative evaluated at the judgmental decision
is equal to zero. The answer to the second question is derived from the closest
boundary of the confidence interval. The decision rule incorporating judg-
ment is admissible and does not perform worse than the judgmental decision
with a probabilty equal to the confidence level. The implication is that aban-
doning a judgmental decision to follow a statistical procedure always carries
the risk of choosing an action worse than the original judgmental decision.
This may happen with a probability bounded above by the confidence level.
For concreteness, consider an investor who is about to take the judgmental
decision a˜, say, to hold all her assets in cash. She asks an econometrician for
advice on whether she should invest some of her money in a stock market
index. The best prediction of the econometrician depends on an estimated
parameter θˆ, which is affected by estimation risk. For a given utility function
provided by the investor, the econometrician can construct a loss function
L(θ, a˜), the loss experienced by the investor if the decision a˜ is taken and
the true parameter is θ. Suppose the econometrician is able to recover the
distribution of the gradient ∇aL(θˆ, a˜) around the true, but unknown θ. It
is possible to test whether the investor’s decision a˜ is optimal by testing the
null hypothesis that ∇aL(θ, a˜) is equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is not
rejected, the econometrician cannot recommend any deviation from a˜. If
the null hypothesis is rejected, statistical evidence suggests that marginal
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Figure 1: Statistical Decision Tree
Note: A decision maker with judgmental decision a˜, confidence level α and loss function
L(θ, a˜) can choose a˜ (branch J) or follow a statistical decision rule (branch Lα). For
a given estimate θˆ of the statistical parameter, the rule tests whether marginal (ε > 0)
deviations from a˜ are warranted. It will not decrease the loss if a˜ is optimal (node H0)
and it will not increase the loss if a˜ is not optimal (node H1). The dashed line connecting
H0 and H1 represents uncertainty, as the decision maker cannot distinguish between the
two parts of the tree and no probability can be attached to them. By choosing α, she can
control the probability p0 of increasing the loss function, in case H0 is true. α provides
also the lower bound to the probability p1 of correctly deviating from a˜ in case H1 is true.
deviations from a˜ decrease the loss function relative to L(θ, a˜).
Denote with α the confidence level used to implement the hypothesis
testing. The investor is facing the decision problem depicted in figure 1. The
investor has two possible choices. She can hold on to her judgmental decision
a˜, denoted by the action J , incurring in the loss L(θ, a˜). Alternatively, she
can follow the econometrician’s advice, which is equivalent to accepting the
bet Lα. In this case, she does not know whether she is facing the upper part
of the decision tree, denoted by the node H0, or the lower part, denoted by
H1. H0 is the unfavorable scenario, in which the null hypothesis is true, so
that any deviation from the judgmental decision a˜ results in a higher loss. A
marginal ε > 0 move away from a˜ results in the loss L(θ, a˜) + |∇aL(θ, a˜)|ε.
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H1 is the favorable scenario, as one correctly rejects the null hypothesis that
a˜ is optimal, producing decisions with lower loss. In this case, a marginal ε
move away from a˜ results in the loss L(θ, a˜) − |∇aL(θ, a˜)|ε. The dash line
connecting the two nodes represents true uncertainty for the decision maker,
in the sense that it is not possible to attach any probability to being in H0 or
in H1. The decision maker can choose the confidence level α, which puts an
upper bound to the probability that the null is wrongly rejected when it is
true. Notice that α represents also the lower bound probability of correctly
rejecting H0 when it is false.
In case of rejection, the investor faces a new, but identical decision prob-
lem, except that a˜ is replaced by a˜± ε (the sign depends on the sign of the
empirical gradient). This new action will be rejected if ∇aL(θˆ, a˜ ± ε) also
falls in the rejection region. Iterating this argument forward, the preferred
decision of the investor is the action a˜ ± ∆ˆ which lies at the boundary of
the (1 − α)-confidence interval of ∇aL(θˆ, a˜ ± ∆ˆ), the point where the null
hypothesis that the decision a˜± ∆ˆ is optimal can no longer be rejected. This
decision is characterized by the fact that it will produce a loss higher than
the original judgmental decision a˜ with probability at most α.
The contribution of this paper lies at the intersection between statistics
and decision theory. Statistical decision theory emerged as a discipline in
the 1950’s with the works of Wald (1950) and Savage (1954). Recent contri-
butions in decision theory focus on modeling behavior when beliefs cannot
be quantified by a unique Bayesian prior (Gilboa and Marinacci, 2013) and
on models of heuristics describing how people arrive at judgmental decisions
(Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010). This paper, however, is not concerned with
the axiomatic foundations of decision theory, but rather with how data can
be used to help decision makers improve their judgmental decisions. It falls
within Clive Granger’s tradition that ‘to obtain any kind of best value for
a point forecast, one requires a criterion against which various alternatives
can be judged’ (Granger and Newbold, 1986, p. 121; see also Granger and
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Machina, 2006). Recent contributions within this tradition are Patton and
Timmermann (2012) and Elliott and Timmermann (2016). Other contribu-
tions include Chamberlain (2000) and Geweke and Whiteman (2006), who
deal with forecasting using Bayesian statistical decision theory, and Manski
(2013 and the references therein), who uses statistical decision theory in the
presence of ambiguity for partial identification of treatment response.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the decision en-
vironment and introduces the concept of judgment in frequentist statistics.
Judgment is defined as a pair formed by a judgmental decision a˜ and a confi-
dence level α. Judgment is used to set up the hypothesis to test whether the
action a˜ is optimal. Two key results of this section are that the decision rule
incorporating judgment is admissible, and that it is either the judgmental
decision itself or is at the boundary of the confidence interval of the sample
gradient of the loss function.
Section 3 discusses the choice of the confidence level α. As illustrated in
figure 1, the confidence level α puts an upper bound to the probability that
the statistical decision rule performs worse than the judgmental decision. The
confidence level can therefore be interpreted as the willingness of the decision
maker to take statistical risk and is referred to as the coefficient of statistical
risk aversion. This concept is closely linked to the idea of ambiguity aversion.
The section also discusses how the confidence level α can be elicited with a
simple experiment involving urns a` la Ellsberg.
Section 4 uses an asset allocation problem as a working example to illus-
trate the empirical performance of various decision rules. Section 5 concludes.
2 Statistical Decision Rules with Judgment
This section introduces the concept of judgment and shows how hypothesis
testing can be used to arrive at optimal decisions. For concreteness, I solve a
simple asset allocation problem, but the example can be easily generalized.
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Consider an investor holding cash, yielding zero nominal returns. The
objective is to minimize a loss function, by deciding what fraction a ∈ R to
invest in a stock market index, yielding the uncertain return X. The decision
environment is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Decision Environment). Let Φ(x) denote the cdf of the
standard normal distribution. The decision environment is defined by:
1. X − θ ∼ Φ(x), where θ ∈ R is unknown.
2. One sample realization x ∈ R is observed.1
3. a ∈ R denotes the action of the decision maker.
4. The decision maker minimizes the loss function L(θ, a) = −aθ+ 0.5a2.
Remark: General case — This decision environment can be generalized
to cover any continuously differentiable and strictly convex loss function, at
the cost of more cumbersome notation. The intuition is the following. Since
the main object of interest is the first derivative of the loss function evaluated
at a and at the maximum likelihood estimator θˆ, an approximation of the
first order conditions around the population parameter θ gives:
∇aL(θˆ, a) ≈ ∇aL(θ, a) +∇aθL(θˆ, a)(θˆ − θ)
The statistical properties of the gradient can therefore be deduced from the
statistical properties of θˆ. The strict convexity of the loss function guarantees
that there is a one to one mapping between a and the gradient (although not
linear as in the decision environment above). 
Consider the following standard definition of a decision rule (Wald, 1950):
1I denote random variables with upper case letters (X) and their realization with lower
case letters (x).
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Definition 2.2 (Decision Rule). δ(X) : R → R is a decision rule, such
that if X = x is the sample realization, δ(x) is the action that will be taken.
Classical statistics as developed by Neyman and Fisher has no explicit
role for epistemic uncertainty (as defined by Marinacci, 2015), as it was mo-
tivated by the desire for objectivity. Non sample information is, nevertheless,
implicitly introduced in various forms, in particular in the choice of the con-
fidence level and the choice of the hypothesis to be tested.
2.1 Judgment
I introduce the following definition of judgment.
Definition 2.3 (Judgment). Judgment is the pair A ≡ {a˜, α}. a˜ ∈ R is
the judgmental decision. α ∈ [0, 1] is the confidence level.
Judgment is routinely used in hypothesis testing, for instance when testing
whether a regression coefficient is statistically different from zero (with zero
in this case playing the role of the judgmental decision), for a given confidence
level (usually 1%, 5% or 10%). I say nothing about how the judgmental de-
cision is formed. This question is explored by Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
and subsequent research. The choice of the confidence level is discussed in
section 3. For the purpose of this paper, judgment is a primitive to the
decision problem, like the loss function.
2.2 Hypothesis Testing
The decision maker can test whether a˜ is optimal by testing if the gradient
∇aL(θ, a˜) = −θ + a˜ is equal to zero. A test statistic for the gradient can be
obtained by replacing θ with its maximum likelihood estimator X.
The novel insight of this paper stems from the realization that the hypoth-
esis to be tested should be conditional on the sample realization x. Having
observed a negative, say, sample gradient ∇aL(x, a˜), one can conclude that
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values of a higher than a˜ decrease the empirical loss function. The decision
maker is interested, however, in the population value of the loss function. If
the population gradient is positive, higher values of a would increase the loss
function, rather than decrease it. Analogous, but opposite considerations
hold if the sample gradient is positive. The null hypothesis to be tested is
therefore that the population gradient has opposite sign relative to the sam-
ple gradient. For a discussion of the importance of conditioning in statistics,
see chapter 10 of Lehmann and Romano (2005) or section 1.6.3 of Berger
(1985) and the references therein.
To formalize, partition the sample space according to the sign taken by
the sample gradient as follows:
C− ≡ {x ∈ R : −x+ a˜ ≤ 0} (1)
C+ ≡ {x ∈ R : −x+ a˜ > 0} (2)
Two cases are possible:
i) x ∈ C−, implying that the null hypothesis to be tested is:
H0 : −θ + a˜ ≥ 0 vs H1 : −θ + a˜ < 0 (3)
ii) x ∈ C+, implying that the null hypothesis to be tested is:
H0 : −θ + a˜ ≤ 0 vs H1 : −θ + a˜ > 0 (4)
2.3 Decision
In an hypothesis testing decision problem, only two actions are possible: The
null hypothesis is either accepted or rejected. Let 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and Φ(cα) = α,
and consider again the two cases, conditional on the sample realization x.
Given the judgment A = {a˜, α}, define the test functions ψAi (x), i ∈ {−,+}
associated with the hypotheses (3)-(4):
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i) x ∈ C−
ψA−(x) =

0 if cα/2 < −x+ a˜ ≤ 0
γ if − x+ a˜ = cα/2
1 if − x+ a˜ < cα/2
(5)
ii) x ∈ C+
ψA+(x) =

0 if 0 < −x+ a˜ < c1−α/2
γ if − x+ a˜ = c1−α/2
1 if − x+ a˜ > c1−α/2
(6)
The following theorem derives the decision compatible with judgment:
Theorem 2.1. (Decision with judgment) Consider the decision environ-
ment of Definition 2.1. A decision maker with judgment A = {a˜, α} selects
the following decision rule:
δA(X) = I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)δA−(X) + I(−X + a˜ > 0)δA+(X) (7)
where I(·) is an indicator function which takes value 1 if its argument is true
and 0 otherwise,
δA−(X) = a˜(1− ψA−(X)) + (x+ cα/2)ψA−(X),
δA+(X) = a˜(1− ψA+(X)) + (x+ c1−α/2)ψA+(X),
cα ≡ Φ−1(α), and ψAi (X), i ∈ {−,+} are the test functions defined in (5)-(6).
Proof — See Appendix.
The decision rule (7) depends not only on the random variable X, but
also on the sample realization x. To understand the intuition, consider the
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case i) x ∈ C− and the associated null hypothesis H0 : −θ + a˜ ≥ 0. The
null hypothesis is a statement about the population gradient evaluated at
the judgmental decision a˜. It says that marginally higher values of a˜ do not
decrease the loss function. If it is not rejected at the given confidence level α,
the chosen action must be a˜. Rejection of the null hypothesis, on the other
hand, implies accepting the alternative, which states that marginally higher
values of a˜ decrease the loss function. Denote the new action marginally
away from a˜ with aε = a˜ + ε, for ε > 0 and sufficiently small. Notice
that aε is not random and it is possible to test whether it is optimal, by
testing again whether additional marginal moves from aε increase the loss
function. This reasoning holds for all null hypotheses H0 : −θ + a ≥ 0
for any a ∈ [a˜, x + cα/2). The first null hypothesis which is not rejected is
H0 : −θ + aˆ ≥ 0, where aˆ = x+ cα/2.
The next theorem shows that this decision cannot be improved.
Theorem 2.2. (Admissibility) The decision δA(X) of Theorem 2.1 is ad-
missible.
Proof — See Appendix.
The admissibility result is a direct consequence of Karlin-Rubin theo-
rem applied to the test functions (5)-(6). It follows from the fact that the
randomness of the decision rule (7) stems from the indicator functions de-
termining the sign of the gradient and from the (conditional) test functions
ψAi (X), i ∈ {−,+}. The actions to be taken in case of rejection (x+ cα/2 or
x+ c1−α/2) or non rejection (a˜) are not random.
3 Choosing the Confidence Level
The confidence level α determines the willingness of the decision maker to
take statistical risk and therefore I equivalently refer to it as the coefficient of
statistical risk aversion. The intuition follows from the decision tree of figure
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1. A decision maker facing a statistical decision problem is about to take the
judgmental decision a˜. The econometrician suggests a statistical decision
rule, which by its random nature may perform worse than a˜. The choice of
α puts an upper bound to the probability that the statistical decision rule
may perform worse than a˜.
This intuition is formalized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Economic interpretation of the confidence level). Con-
sider the decision environment of Definition 2.1 and assume the decision
maker has judgment A ≡ {a˜, α}. The decision rule δA(X) in (7) performs
worse than the judgmental decision a˜ with probability not greater than α:
Pθ(L(θ, δA(X)) > L(θ, a˜)) ≤ α (8)
Proof — See Appendix.
An extremely statistical risk averse decision maker chooses α = 0. A
zero confidence level results in a degenerate confidence interval which co-
incides with the entire real line. As a consequence, it is never possible to
reject the null hypothesis that the judgmental decision a˜ is optimal. At the
other extreme, a statistical risk loving decision maker chooses α = 1. When
α = 1 the confidence interval degenerates into a single point, which coin-
cides with the maximum likelihood decision. In this case, the null hypothesis
that a˜ is optimal is always rejected and the decision maker is fully exposed
to the possibility that the statistical decision rule will perform worse than
the judgmental decision. An intermediate case of statistical risk aversion is
represented by the subjective classical estimator of Manganelli (2009), which
sets α ∈ (0, 1).
The degree of statistical risk aversion α can be elicited with an experiment
a` la Ellsberg (1961) where the decision maker has to choose among different
couples of urns. Accepting the advice of an econometrician is like accepting
a bet with Nature where the probabilities of the payoff are only partially
11
Table 1: Experiment to elicit the confidence level α
Urn 1 Urn 2
Bet White Black White Red
0 100 0 100 0
1 ≥ 99 ≤ 1 ≤ 99 ≥ 1
2 ≥ 98 ≤ 2 ≤ 98 ≥ 2
... ... ... ... ...
98 ≥ 2 ≤ 98 ≤ 2 ≥ 98
99 ≥ 1 ≤ 99 ≤ 1 ≥ 99
100 0 100 0 100
Note: The decision maker can choose one of the bets from 0 to 100. She will face Urn 1
or Urn 2 with unknown probability. If a white ball is extracted, nothing happens. If a
black ball is extracted, the decision maker loses AC100. If a red ball is extracted, she wins
a utility equivalent euro amount. Urn 1 and Urn 2 correspond, respectively, to the nodes
H0 and H1 of the decision tree in figure 1. The decision maker can partially choose the
composition of the urns. For instance, by choosing bet 2, she knows that Urn 1 does not
contain more than 2 black balls and Urn 2 contains at least 2 red balls.
specified.
Consider two urns with 100 balls each. Urn 1 contains only white and
black balls, Urn 2 contains white and red balls. If the black ball is extracted,
the respondent loses AC100. If the red ball is extracted, the respondent wins an
amount in euros which gives an increase in utility equivalent to the reduction
in utility produced by the loss of AC100. If the white ball is extracted, nothing
happens. The respondent can choose among the composition of the urns
described in table 1. By accepting one of the bets from 1 to 99, she can
control the upper bound probability of losing in case balls are drawn from
Urn 1. By choosing this upper bound probability, she automatically chooses
the lower bound probability of winning in case the ball is drawn from Urn 2.
To understand the link with the statistical decision problem, consider
again figure 1. Urn 1 corresponds to node H0 in the upper part of the
decision tree in figure 1. Urn 2 corresponds to node H1 in the lower part
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of the decision tree. The worst case scenario is when the null hypothesis is
true, as in this case deviations from a˜ increase the loss. However, even in
this case, according to the decision rule (7) there is still the possibility that
the null hypothesis is not rejected, in which case the chosen action is a˜. The
choice of the confidence level α controls the probability of wrongly rejecting
the null. When the null hypothesis is true, it is like having the ball extracted
from Urn 1, and choosing α is like choosing the maximum number of black
balls contained in Urn 1. The favorable scenario is when the conditional
null hypothesis is false. In this case, rejection of the null leads to the choice
of a better action, in the sense that it produces a lower loss. When the
null hypothesis is false, it is like having the ball extracted from Urn 2. The
probability of correctly rejecting the null depends on the power of the test,
but is in any case greater than the chosen confidence level α. Choosing α is
like choosing the minimum number of red balls contained in Urn 2.
In real world situations, one does not know whether the null hypothesis
is true or not, which represents genuine uncertainty and is indicated by the
dashed line in figure 1. This is like saying to the participants in the ex-
periment that it is unknown from which urn the ball will be extracted. An
extremely statistical risk averse player would always choose not to participate
to the bet and retain the judgmental decision a˜, a choice corresponding to
bet 0 in the table. A statistical risk loving player would choose bet 100. In
general, players with higher degrees of statistical risk aversion would choose
bets with lower numbers.
4 An Asset Allocation Example
This section implements the decision with judgment, solving a standard port-
folio allocation problem.
The empirical implementation of the mean-variance asset allocation model
introduced by Markowitz (1952) has puzzled economists for a long time.
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Despite its theoretical success, it is well-known that plug-in and Bayesian
estimators of the portfolio weights produce volatile asset allocations which
usually perform poorly out of sample, due to estimation errors (Jobson and
Korkie 1981, Brandt 2007). This paper takes a different perspective on this
problem. The decision with judgment provides an asset allocation which does
not perform worse than any given judgmental allocation with a probability
equal to the confidence level.
To implement the statistical decision rules, I take a monthly series of
closing prices for the EuroStoxx50 index, from January 1999 until December
2015. EuroStoxx50 covers the 50 leading Blue-chip stocks for the Eurozone.
The data is taken from Bloomberg. The closing prices are converted into
period log returns. Table 2 reports summary statistics.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
206 -0.06% 5.57% 0.66% -20.62% 13.70
Note: Summary statistics of the monthly returns of the Eu-
roStoxx50 index from January 1999 to December 2015.
The exercise consists of forecasting the next period optimal investment
in the Eurostoxx50 index of a person who holds AC100 cash. I take the first 7
years of data as pre-sample observations, to estimate the optimal investment
for January 2006. The estimation window then expands by one observation
at a time, the new allocation is estimated, and the whole exercise is repeated
until the end of the sample.
To directly apply the decision with judgment as discussed in section 2,
which assumes the variance to be known, I transform the data as follows.
I first divide the return series of each window by the full sample standard
deviation, and next multiply them by the square root of the number of obser-
vations in the estimation sample. Denoting by {x˜t}nt=1 the original time series
of log returns, let σ be the full sample standard deviation and n1 < n the size
of the first estimation sample. Then, for each n1 +s, s = 0, 1, 2, ..., n−n1−1,
14
Figure 2: Evolution of portfolio values
Note: Time evolution of the value of a portfolio invested in cash and the EuroStoxx50
index following the investment recommendations of the different decision rules.
define:
{xt}n1+st=1 ≡ {
√
(n1 + s)x˜t/σ}n1+st=1 and x¯n1+s ≡ (n1 + s)−1
n1+s∑
t=1
xt (9)
I ‘help’ the estimates by providing the full sample standard deviation,
so that the only parameter to be estimated is the mean return. Under the
assumption that the full sample standard deviation is the population value,
by the central limit theorem x¯n1+s is normally distributed with variance equal
to one and unknown mean. I can therefore implement the decision rule with
judgment, using the single observation x¯n1+s for each period n1 + s.
Figure 2 reports the portfolio values associated with different decision
rules. For comparison, I have also included a Bayesian decision with a stan-
dard normal prior. Suppose the starting value of the portfolio in January
2006 is AC100. By the end of the sample, after 10 years, an investor using the
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maximum likelihood decision rule would have lost one quarter of the value of
her portfolio. The situation is slightly better with the Bayesian decision rule,
as it delivers a loss of around 12%. The decision with judgment at confidence
level at 1% does not lose anything because it never predicts deviating from
the judgmental allocation of holding all the money in cash.
The point of this discussion is not to evaluate whether one decision rule
is better than the other, as the decision rules differ only with respect to
the choice of the confidence level and the prior, which are both a subjective
choice. The purpose is rather to illustrate the implications of choosing dif-
ferent confidence levels. By choosing the maximum likelihood and Bayesian
estimators, one has no control on the statistical risk she is going to bear.
The decision with judgment, instead, allows the investor to choose a con-
stant probability of underperforming the judgmental allocation: She can be
confident that the resulting asset allocation is not worse than the judgmen-
tal allocation with the chosen probability. The case of the EuroStoxx50,
however, represents only one possible draw, which turned out to be partic-
ularly adverse to the maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimators. Had
the resulting allocation implied positive returns by the end of the sample,
maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimators would have outperformed the
decisions with judgment. There is no free lunch: Decision rules with higher
statistical risk aversion produce allocations with greater protection to under-
performance relative to the judgmental allocation, but also have lower upside
potential. In statistical jargon, lower confidence levels protect the decision
maker from Type I errors, but imply higher probabilities of Type II errors.
5 Conclusion
Judgment plays an important role not just for individuals, but also in policy
institutions. Most policy decisions are shaped by the judgment of policy
makers. When advising a policy maker, the econometrician can test whether
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the preferred judgmental decision is supported by data. If not, the decision
incorporating judgment is always at the closest boundary of the confidence
interval. The probability of obtaining higher losses than those implied by
the judgmental decision is bounded by the given confidence level.
The confidence level reflects the attitude of the decision maker towards
statistical uncertainty. I have referred to it as the coefficient of statistical risk
aversion. It can be elicited with experiments involving urns a` la Ellsberg.
Decision makers characterized by an exteme form of statistical risk aversion
(a confidence level equal to 0) always follow their own judgmental decision
and ignore the advice of the econometrician. At the other extreme, statistical
risk loving decision makers (with a confidence level equal to 1) ignore their
judgment and always follow the econometrician’s advice, which in this special
case corresponds to the maximum likelihood decision. Policy makers are
likely characterized by high, but not extreme, coefficients of statistical risk
aversion. The framework provided in this paper to measure it may have
profound policy implications.
Appendix — Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1 — Consider only the case i) I(−x+a˜ ≤ 0) = 1. The
other case can be proven in a similar way. If ψA−(x) = 0, the null hypothesis
H0 : −θ+ a˜ ≥ 0 is not rejected at the given confidence level α. a˜ is therefore
retained as the chosen action.
If ψA−(x) = 1, the null hypothesis is rejected. Rejection of the null implies
acceptance of the alternative hypothesis H0 : −θ + a˜ ≤ 0, that is marginal
moves away from a˜ by a sufficiently small amount ∆ > 0 decrease the loss
function.
Consider now the family of null hypotheses H∆0 : −θ+a˜+∆ ≥ 0 for ∆ > 0.
Define also the family of rejection regions R∆ ≡ {y ∈ R : −y+ a˜+∆ < cα/2}.
Clearly, x /∈ R∆ for any ∆ ≥ ∆ˆ ≡ cα/2 + x − a˜, that is the null hypothesis
H∆0 is not rejected at the confidence level α for any ∆ ≥ ∆ˆ.
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Denote with aˆ the chosen action and suppose that aˆ 6= a˜ + ∆ˆ. If aˆ =
a˜ + ∆ < a˜ + ∆ˆ, this implies that x ∈ R∆, that is H∆0 : −θ + a˜ + ∆ ≥ 0 is
rejected. Therefore this decision cannot be optimal.
If aˆ = a˜ + ∆ > a˜ + ∆ˆ, continuity implies that it exists ε > 0 such that
the null H∆−ε0 : −θ + (aˆ + ∆ − ε) ≥ 0 was rejected at the given confidence
level α, even though x /∈ R∆−ε, which implies a contradiction.
The chosen action must therefore be aˆ = a˜+ ∆ˆ = cα/2 + x. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2 — The risk function of a generic decision δ∗ is:
R(θ, δ∗) = Eθ(I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)R−(θ, δ∗) + I(−X + a˜ > 0)R+(θ, δ∗))
where
R−(θ, δ∗) ≡ Eθ|−X+a˜≤0(L(θ, δ∗(X))) (10)
R+(θ, δ∗) ≡ Eθ|−X+a˜>0(L(θ, δ∗(X))) (11)
and the expectations are taken with respect to the truncated normal distri-
bution.
Consider equation (10). The case for equation (11) can be proven sim-
ilarly. I prove that the decision δA−(X) is admissible with respect to the
truncated normal distribution. This implies that R−(θ, δA−) ≤ R−(θ, δ∗) for
all θ. Since the same holds for δA+(X), these two results together imply that
R(θ, δA) ≤ R(θ, δ∗) and therefore that δA(X) is admissible.
To prove that δA−(X) is admissible with respect to the truncated normal
distribution, I verify that the conditions of theorem 4 of Karlin and Rubin
(1956) hold. First, note that the truncated normal distribution belongs to
the exponential family and therefore possesses a monotone likelihood ratio
(see section 1 of Karlin and Rubin, 1956). Second, conditional on observing
−X + a˜ ≤ 0, the decision rule of theorem 2.1 foresees two actions: either
the null hypothesis (3) is accepted or rejected. Denote these actions with a1
18
and a2, respectively. Define the corresponding losses from the original loss
function:
L1(θ) ≡ −a˜θ + 0.5a˜2
L2(θ) ≡ −(x+ cα/2)θ + 0.5(x+ cα/2)2
and note that
L1(θ)− L2(θ) = −θ(a˜− x− cα/2) + 0.5(a˜2 − (x+ cα/2)2)
This function is linear in θ and therefore changes sign only once as a function
of θ, specifically at the finite value θ = 0.5(a˜ + x + cα/2). Since ψA−(x) is a
monotone procedure, the conditions of theorem 4 of Karlin and Rubin (1956)
are satisfied and δA−(X) is admissible. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1 — Partitioning the sample space with respect to
the gradient −X + a˜:
I(L(θ, δA(X)) > L(θ, a˜)) = I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)I(L(θ, δA−(X)) > L(θ, a˜))
+ I(−X + a˜ > 0)I(L(θ, δA+(X)) > L(θ, a˜))
Consider again only the case i) I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0) = 1, as the other one is
similar.
Let us find out first the values of a for which L(θ, a) > L(θ, a˜). This
is equivalent to finding out when the function −aθ + 0.5a2 + a˜θ − 0.5a˜2 is
positive, which it is for a < θ − | − θ + a˜| and a > θ + | − θ + a˜|. Therefore:
I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)I(L(θ, δA−(X)) > L(θ, a˜)) =
= I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)(I(δA−(X) < θ − | − θ + a˜|)+ (12)
+ I(δA−(X) > θ + | − θ + a˜|)) (13)
and note also that δA−(X) = a˜+ (x+ cα/2 − a˜)ψA−(X).
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Suppose first that −θ + a˜ > 0. Substituting the decision rule and rear-
ranging the terms, the term (12) is equal to:
I(δA−(X) < θ − | − θ + a˜|) = I(δA−(X) < 2θ − a˜)
= I((x+ cα/2 − a˜)ψA−(X) < 2θ − 2a˜)
= 0
because (x+ cα/2 − a˜)ψA−(X) ≥ 0, and the term (13) is equal to:
I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)I(δA−(X) > a˜)
= I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)I((x+ cα/2 − a˜)ψA−(X) > 0)
= I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)I(−X + a˜ < cα/2)
= I(−X + θ < cα/2 + θ − a˜)
≤ I(−X + θ < cα/2)
where the inequality follows from the fact that the case currently analyzed
is −θ + a˜ > 0.
If −θ + a˜ < 0, similar reasoning can be used to show that the terms (12)
and (13) are equal to:
I(δA−(X) < a˜) = 0
I(−X + a˜ ≤ 0)I(δA−(X) > 2θ − a˜) ≤ I(−X + θ < cα/2)
Combining all these results gives:
Eθ(I(L(θ, δA(X)) > L(θ, a˜))) ≤ Eθ(I(−X + θ < cα/2) + I(−X + θ > c1−α/2))
= α 
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